INEC guidelines: Necessary reform or incomplete solution?

By Ayodele Babalola

These disputes have frequently resulted in extensive pre-election litigation, delays in electoral preparations, uncertainty about candidates, and increased pressure on the judiciary. The introduction of an INEC-supported ADR mechanism reflects an acknowledgement that litigation alone cannot effectively resolve Nigeria’s recurring political party conflicts. ADR offers the possibility of faster, less adversarial, and more relationship-preserving dispute resolution.

However, while the framework is a welcome development, its effectiveness will depend on whether it addresses the underlying causes of political party disputes and whether it provides sufficient legal certainty regarding participation, outcomes, and enforcement. This may be INEC’s most elaborate attempt to institutionalize ADR through its Regulations, but it is certainly not its first attempt at entrenching the ADR process.

The Daily Trust (Feb. 9, 2023) reported that 1,241 intra-party pre-election suits were instituted in the 2023 general election cycle, compared with about 809 in the 2019 general election cycle, according to Punch (May 28, 2019). To discourage such suits, the National Assembly enacted Section 83(5) of the Electoral Act 2026, which provides that no court in Nigeria shall exercise jurisdiction over any suit or matter pertaining to the internal affairs of a political party. Where such action is brought in negation of this provision, it further provides in Section 83(6)(b) that the court shall, at the conclusion of the matter, impose costs of not less than N10m on the counsel who filed the action and not less than N10m on the Plaintiff/Applicant, and in addition to payment to the commission of any cost, including solicitors’ fees incurred by it where joined as a party.

However, in its recent decision in Chris Nduka v INEC & Ors, Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/721/2026 delivered on the 23rd day of July 2026, the Federal High Court declared that only its Chief Judge is empowered to make rules of court or practice directions governing the award of costs in proceedings before the Federal High Court, such that any legislative attempt by the National Assembly to fix or limit such costs, including Section 83(6)(b) of the Electoral Act 2026 in favour of the INEC (who is entitled to yearly budgetary allocations for all its litigation cases) constitutes an unconstitutional derogation of the Court’s inherent judicial power and is therefore null, void, and of no effect to the extent of its inconsistency.

The court also declared that Section 83(6)(b) unlawfully fetters the discretionary powers of a Judge of the Federal High Court, interferes with the constitutional duty and functions of the judiciary, thereby constitutes an unconstitutional intrusion into judicial proceedings and is contrary to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Constitution, which collectively preserve the separation of powers between the legislature, executive, and judiciary.

The ADR provisions in the 2026 regulations, therefore, address a genuine institutional gap by creating a formal mechanism for resolving disputes before they escalate into litigation.

In exercising its powers to monitor and direct the organisation and operation of political parties, the commission established an Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism to resolve all internal disputes of political parties in its 2026 Regulations.

According to section 47(1) of the 2026 Regulations, if a political party is unable to resolve any internal dispute through the dispute resolution mechanism provided in its Constitution, the Commission may refer such disputes to its ADR mechanism.

A political party or aggrieved member(s) thereof may also, on their own initiative, refer such dispute to the Commission’s ADR Division for Mediation pursuant to section 47(2). According to section 47(4) & (5), the parties are to agree on a sole Mediator from the list of accredited Mediators accredited by the Commission, and where they fail to do so within two weeks of the reference, the Commission shall appoint one of its accredited Mediators to mediate the dispute.

This differs from the previous approach, in which staff of the AEDR unit within the INEC served as a third-party neutral. Also, under section 47(7), any settlement or determination reached at the conclusion of the ADR process shall be in writing, signed by the parties to the dispute, and binding on them.

The bindingness of such a settlement is, however, subject to Section 88(2) of the Electoral Act 2026, which provides that an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election may apply to the Federal High Court for redress.

The ADR process shall be concluded within three (3) months, and the parties shall bear the cost of the mediation in accordance with sections 47(8) & (9) of the 2026 Regulations. They shall also participate in the ADR process in good faith and comply with all procedural directions issued by the Commission under section 47(3).

Despite its advantages, the ADR framework in electoral governance raises important questions regarding its history, the enforceability of settlements reached through mediation, and its scope. INEC introduced ADR in 2008 to resolve electoral disputes and, in 2011, established an AEDR Directorate comprising election officials to implement the project.

According to an IFES, ADR Case Study: Nigeria, and the INEC (2012) draft AEDR guide, the objective was for the staff of this unit within the INEC to “act as a third-party neutral which can confidentially address the resolution of intra-political party disputes, electoral issues before, during and after elections,” and “assist the courts in timely addressing electoral cases … and the public and parties in fact-finding, early warning monitoring and in the mediation of electoral disputes.”

The IFES Report notes that the ADR mechanism in INEC remains underused and underfunded. There is also no widely documented, comprehensive INEC database on the effectiveness of its AEDR Directorate or how well the political class utilised it.

Also, a settlement agreement is only effective if the parties comply with it in good faith and voluntarily, or if there are clear legal consequences for non-compliance.

A party or faction may participate in mediation as a strategic step while intending to pursue litigation or disregard an unfavourable settlement. Without stronger enforcement mechanisms, ADR risks becoming merely another procedural stage before litigation rather than a genuine dispute resolution mechanism. The requirement for parties to participate in ADR in good faith under section 47(4) of the 2026 Regulations is appropriate but difficult to enforce.

Political disputes are often driven by competing ambitions and strategic calculations. The 2026 Regulations could strengthen this aspect by defining minimum standards of participation, including attendance at mediation sessions, disclosure of relevant information, and genuine engagement with settlement proposals.

This could be clarified in the “procedural directions” alluded to in the 2026 Regulations. Without such safeguards, parties may exploit ADR as a delay tactic rather than a genuine method of dispute resolution, despite the three-month period set out in Section 47(8) of the 2026 Regulations.

The 2026 Regulations also describe the settlements and determinations made at the end of the process as binding but subject them to the rights of political parties and aspirants under Section 88 of the Electoral Act 2026 to litigate certain issues, specifically, the application to the Federal High Court for redress by a political party, or an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election.

This suggests that other settlements arising from internal party disputes are binding, but it also introduces uncertainty. Despite the laudable attempts in the 2026 regulation, clearer guidance is needed on which disputes are suitable for mediation and on the implications of binding settlements. Certain disputes are naturally appropriate for ADR, including membership disputes; disagreements concerning party administration; leadership conflicts; internal disciplinary matters; and disputes relating to the interpretation of party rules.

Disputes generally involving statutory violations, constitutional questions, or unlawful electoral conduct may, however, require judicial determination. Beyond the Section 88 statutory exception, there should be a clearer distinction between disputes that are suitable for mediation and those that are not.

The ADR provisions in the 2026 regulations represent an important step towards improving political party dispute resolution in Nigeria. They recognise that excessive reliance on litigation has contributed to electoral uncertainty and weakened internal party democracy.

However, the framework requires further strengthening. The legal status and enforceability of ADR settlements should be clarified; the categories of disputes suitable for ADR should be defined more clearly; and mechanisms should be introduced to discourage bad-faith participation. ADR should serve as a complementary mechanism that encourages early dispute resolution and strengthens internal party governance.

Qualified mediators who will earn the confidence and trust of aggrieved parties should be placed on INEC’s accredited mediators list, which should be made public. If properly implemented, the framework can reduce unnecessary litigation, improve political party accountability, and contribute to a more stable and credible electoral system, as we move towards the 2027 general elections.

Finally, as a regulatory provision, the ADR framework falls under the category of transient provisions, with its survival contingent on similar provisions in the next batch of regulations for the 2031 elections. This raises another question: is it not high time for a statutory framework for Alternative Electoral Dispute Resolution?

Ayodele Babalola is a legal practitioner